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State Aid in the Enlarged European Union 
An Overview 
Abstract 
In the early phase of transition that started with the 1990s, Central and Eastern Euro-
pean Countries pursued economic restructuring of the enterprise sector that involved 
massive injections of state support. Also foreign investment from the West and facilita-
tion of the development of a market economy involved massive injections of state sup-
port. With their accession to the European Union (EU), levels and forms of state aid 
came  under  critical  review  by  the  European  Commission.  This  inquiry  investigates 
whether the integration of the new member states operates on a level playing field with 
respect to state aid. Quantitative and qualitative analysis is relied upon to answer this 
key, as well as other, related questions. Findings suggest that in recent years a level 
playing field across the EU has indeed emerged. State aid in the new EU member coun-
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Staatliche Beihilfen in der erweiterten  
Europäischen Union  
Ein Überblick 
Zusammenfassung 
Als die Frühphase der Transformation in den neunziger Jahren begann, haben die Län-
der Mittel- und Osteuropas (MOEL) den Unternehmenssektor durch massive staatliche 
Unterstützungen restrukturiert, wobei der Fokus auf der Privatisierung und Liberalisie-
rung traditioneller Industrien lag. Aber auch ausländische Direktinvestitionen und die 
Schaffung einer Marktwirtschaft erforderten massive staatliche Unterstützung. Mit dem 
Beitritt der MOEL zur Europäischen Union (EU) kamen die Höhe und auch die Form 
der gewährten staatlichen Unterstützung unter die kritische Beobachtung der Europäi-
schen Kommission. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht, wie sich die europäische Bei-
hilfekontrolle auf die Ausrichtung der nationalen Beihilfepolitiken der MOEL nach dem 
Beitritt in die EU ausgewirkt hat. In einer quantitativen Analyse werden daher Beihilfe-
niveaus und -ziele der MOEL denen der westeuropäischen EU-Länder gegenüberge-
stellt. Darüber hinaus werden in einer qualitativen Untersuchung Entscheidungen der 
Kommission in Bezug auf nicht genehmigte Beihilfen analysiert, um etwaige Unter-
schiede in den Beihilfepolitiken der ost- und westeuropäischen Länder herauszustellen. 
Die Resultate zeigen, dass in den letzten Jahren ein einheitliches level playing field in 
Bezug auf staatliche Beihilfen entstanden ist. So zeigte sich nach dem EU-Beitritt der 
MOEL eine rasche Annäherung der staatlichen Beihilfen an den Durchschnitt der west-
lichen  EU-Länder  in  Bezug  auf  die  Gesamtausgaben.  Hinsichtlich  der  Verwendung 
staatlicher Beihilfen zeichnen sich zwar Unterschiede ab, allerdings nicht allein gegen-
über den westeuropäischen EU-Ländern, sondern auch innerhalb der MOEL. 
 
JEL-Klassifikation: H25, L50, P20 
 
Schlagworte:  Wettbewerbspolitik,  ökonomische  Transformation,  EU-Osterweiterung, 
staatliche Beihilfen 
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Introduction1 
In the early 1990s, and towards the start of the transition phase, Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries (CEECs)2 relied upon public sector outlays to promote industrial re-
structuring. State aid included tax incentives for investors, establishment of special eco-
nomic zones, and the like, with an additional focus designed to support flows of foreign 
investments from the West. Some of these CEECs are now fully integrated in Europe’s 
common market and their integration has come under critical review by the European 
Commission. This inquiry investigates whether the integration of the new European Un-
ion (EU) member states operates on a level playing field with respect to receiving vari-
ous forms of public sector aid. 
An earlier analysis (Hölscher and Stephan, 2009) reveals that effectiveness of imple-
mentation of competition law and policy and intensity of competition run lower for 
CEECs  compared  to  the  EU-15  countries.  This  inquiry  aims  to  clarify  whether  this 
comparatively lower level of performance results as state aid is granted more generously 
(with less supervision, scrutiny, and lower levels of accountability) in the CEECs. And 
also  do  funds  tend  to be  targeted  at  individual  firms  or  industries?  Röller  and  Hir-
schhausen (1996) expected major implications  regarding the assessment of state aid 
measures in former socialist countries having in mind the experience from East Germa-
ny. Thus, we consider how state aid policy in the CEECs has developed over recent 
years since full EU membership and whether indeed their industrial policies during and 
after transition challenged the European state aid regime.  
CEECs have a strong tradition of government intervention resulting from the planned 
economy system. Even at the dawn of EU accession their level of public support to cer-
tain industries and individual firms was significantly higher than in the EU-15 member 
states. Three years after accession a study by Hashi et al. (2007, p. 51) found that “the 
general philosophy [regarding state aid policies] does not appear to have changed fun-
damentally since the accession”. The authors inquire: Does government intervention in 
the form of state aid influence industrial competitiveness? They find that competitive-
ness is not improved by state aid policies but by the firms’ efforts themselves. Another 
related work compares state aid at an international level. The authors find differences 
between European countries and the US where the amount of subsidies is markedly 
lower (Buigues and Sekkat 2010). However, that paper fails to include the CEECs. 
                                                 
1   This research project was supported by the Halle Institute of Economic Research (IWH). We espe-
cially thank John Hall and Marina Gruševaja for reviewing the paper and providing critical com-
ments and helpful suggestions. We have benefited from comments from the audience at the EACES 
Conference 2010 and the Research Seminar 2010 given at IWH. We assume responsibility for all er-
rors. 
2   In the context of this article, Central and Eastern European countries are the following ten most re-
cent member states of the European Union: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.  
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State aid takes numerous forms. For example, state aid would include those public funds 
that a national government allocates to its own domestic firms and industries, taking the 
form of subsidies, tax reductions, guarantees and the like. State aid is monitored and 
controlled by the European Commission by requiring member states to notify in prin-
ciple the Commission in advance. This study compares justifications for state aid in 
theory and also in practice. This inquiry considers the question: are CEECs treated dif-
ferently in terms of the kind of justifications used, or the kind of state aid notifications 
(e.g. biases  on particular  kinds  of  state  aid,  in  particular  industries,  stages  of  value 
chain, technology, knowledge, education)? If “yes,” how does that affect the playing 
field across the European economic space? The Commission has the right to approve or 
refuse to approve proposed state aid; aid that is not notified to and tested by the Com-
mission is defined as unlawful. Under the present procedural rules, the Commission is 
under obligation to order the recovery from the beneficiaries of any unlawful aid that is 
found to be incompatible with the common market. 
This study is structured into five sections. Section two places state aid into the context 
of economic theory and EU competition policy, and then proceeds to the accession ne-
gotiations with the new EU member countries. This section concludes with an overview 
of the development of a competition culture compared with the average of the ‘old’ EU-
15 member countries. Relevant literature is also reviewed. Section three provides sty-
lised facts of state aid in comparative perspective. For this quantitative analysis statistics 
and data provided by the European Commission and national authorities are used. Sec-
tion  four presents  selected  exemplary  cases  in  which  state  aid  delivered  to  selected 
CEECs was declared unlawful. In this qualitative analysis court cases are used to identi-
fy the rationale for the decisions made by the Commission. This delivers an assessment 
of the effectiveness of state aid control in the EU common market with particular refer-
ence to the CEECs. Finally, this study evaluates the adequacy of current procedures 
with a view on a level playing field for doing business in the European Union. 
Economic Theory and the EC Treaty  
The main economic justification for state aid is to enhance efficiency in order to opti-
mise total welfare. However, as there are several different types of aid, their motivation 
varies as well. Accordingly, state aid is used to correct market failures, like externali-
ties, asymmetric information or market power and coordination problems and in respect 
of public goods. A very common example of positive externalities are R&D activities. 
Private companies face the difficulty to internalize the spillovers of R&D which leads to 
an under-investment by private firms. Thus, most governments provide public funds to 
support R&D activities. 
Another justification for public subsidies are information asymmetries. Companies, es-
pecially SMEs might face difficulties in acquiring loan capital as the information about 
the potential of an SME to return a loan or on the risk of its projects are unknown.  
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In the case of industry or even firm specific aid besides market failure justifications ad-
ditional arguments are needed, since there is a cost of public funds, optimization of gov-
ernment resources may call for intervention in specific sectors or industries in which ex-
ternalities can have a larger impact on total welfare. First, bankruptcy of a large enter-
prise may lead to market power concentration and a possible reduction of total welfare. 
Second, in terms of restructuring firms, which have been crucial in the transition Central 
and  Eastern  Europe  economies,  state  aid  smoothes  the  process  of  restructuring  and 
therefore mitigates negative social externalities (Nitsche and Heidhues 2006, 21). Third, 
agglomeration externalities might justify state aid measures for specific industries. The 
notion of cluster denotes the necessity of firms devoted to similar or related activities in 
a well defined region due to the costly transmission of tacit knowledge over increased 
geographical distance. Industrial policy may foster the creation of clusters by possibly 
subsidizing firms generating these externalities. On the other hand, governments may 
not have all the necessary information to determine which industries are capable of ge-
nerating these agglomeration effects (Gual and Jodar-Rosell, 2006). A fourth possible 
justification for sector-specific aid lies in the market failure of imperfect competition, 
constituting the basis for strategic trade policy developed first by Brander and Spencer 
(1983). In an imperfect, oligopolistic market subsidising local companies will increase 
welfare of the subsidising state as the profit of foreign companies will be directed to the 
local company as the latter could reduce costs and thus also prices. A classical example 
in a European context is the Airbus case, documented in Neven and Seabright (1995).  
Besides economic considerations also equity concerns may justify the provision of state 
aid in order to correct social inequalities, e.g. training for employees in a specific indus-
try. Total welfare will be increased if the benefits in terms of social and cohesion goals 
outweigh the negative effects of distorting competition.  
Some forms of state aid involve a mix of efficiency and equity justifications. Regional 
aid presents such a mix To the social and cohesion goals, Rodrik (2004) argues that 
there is a market failure in the process of discovering activities that can be profitably 
adapted to local conditions: social value of experimenting with new activities is high 
whereas private costs for entrepreneurs are significant and benefits, if they exist, would 
be shared with followers. In such cases, a partnership between government and private 
firms would be desirable.  
Aside from economic and social justifications and on the other side of the coin, inter-
vention in the market to overcome ‘market failure’ may be associated with the danger of 
‘government failure’. Centralised institutions are ‘doomed to choose’, have the problem 
of ‘picking winners’. The complex and constantly changing nature of interdependence 
of markets and the information problems associated with this led the EU to adopt a ra-
ther pragmatic, horizontal approach to industrial policy. With regard to state-aid, how-
ever, “[t]he idea that the government can disengage from specific policies and just focus 
on providing broad-based  support  to  all  activities in  a  neutral  way  is  an  illusion...” 
(Hausmann and Rodrik 2006, p. 24).  
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Yet, since the enactment in 1958 the EC Treaty ever contained rules regulating industri-
al policies and the provision of state aid. The primary function of such a control is to en-
sure a free competition between enterprises from different member states on the Com-
mon market. European state aid control is based on Articles 107 to 109 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and its interpretation by the European 
Commission (laid down in decisions and regulations) and the judgements of the Euro-
pean Courts.  
Article 107 (1) TFEU broadly defines:  
“Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a 
Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoev 
er which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favour 
ing  certain  undertakings  or  the  production  of  certain  goods 
shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, be in 
compatible with the common market.” 
Thus, in general state aid is prohibited if the aid measure is granted through state re-
sources ans might distort competition in the internal market. However, Article 107 (2) 
TFEU and Article 107 (3) TFEU list the exemptions from the prohibition in order to 
balance competition and trade considerations against the wider objectives of the EU 
(e.g. economic and social cohesion). These two paragraphs build the foundation for sev-
eral exemptions which are mainly codified in the Commission's soft law. One of these 
regulations is the general block exemption regulation (GBER) which was introduced in 
2008 regarding exemptions for several horizontal objectives of aid (e.g. aid for research 
and development, environmental aid).  
The European state aid control system finds a justification in several economic theories. 
In the reasoning of the traditional foreign trade theory the reduction of trade barriers be-
tween countries will generate welfare effects due to the exploitation of absolute and 
comparative economics. Foreign trade theory however, does not show distortionary ef-
fects of state aid measures as it uses a static model assuming perfect competition. State 
aid measures would have no short term effect on capacities in the market but would on-
ly increase profit of the benefited company. In contrast, the Strategic Trade Theory as-
sumes an imperfect, oligopolistic market: to subsidise a local company which would in-
crease welfare of the subsidising state: profit of foreign companies would be directed to 
the local company as the latter could reduce cost and thus reduce prices. As every state 
has the same incentive to subsidise a subsidy race would follow. Thus, in the reasoning 
of the Strategic Trade Theory state aid regulation is fundamental to ensure a level play-
ing field across the EU. Therefore, the aim of state aid control would be to prohibit state 
aid in order to prevent such a subsidy race. Another perspective is identified by the New 
Political Economics. Subsidising firms, especially rescuing large firms, is often a politi-
cally attractive option in order to increase popularity and the chance to win elections.  
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2.a  Enforcement of State Aid Control in the European Union  
Based on Article 108 TFEU (ex. Art. 88) the power of state aid regulation in the EU is 
firmly allocated to the European Commission in the Directorate General Competition. 
All state aid measures have to be notified to the Commission and can only be put into 
effect until having been approved by the EU.  If the Commission regards a measure as 
not compatible with state aid rules it comes to a negative decision. Firms that already 
received aid without EU consent may be liable to paying back if the aid was disap-
proved of ex post. Such a recovery of unlawful aid is not explicitly mentioned in prima-
ry legislation but was won by the Commission in case law. In its Kohlengesetz decision 
in 1973 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) established the Commission’s power, in 
order for a negative decision ‘to be of practical effect’, to ‘require repayment of aid 
granted in breach of the Treaty’ in addition to requiring the member state concerned to 
abolish or modify any aid found to be incompatible with the common market (Santa 
Maria 2007, p. 5 and European Commission 2007). 
The enforcement of European state aid rules is sometimes denoted to be “subdued” 
(Santa Maria, 2007, p. 3). In the 1950s to 70s most countries pursued an industrial poli-
cy which saw in public subsidies a panacea for growth and development leading to a 
non-compliance with European state aid rules (Zuleeg 1978). It took the Commission 
years to establish and enforce the simple rule of notification for state aid schemes. For 
many years the member states were reluctant to honour the Commission’s decisions or 
rulings of the ECJ in such cases (Slot 1990, Lasok 1990). The first negative decision re-
garding state aid was published in 1964 (Ford Tractor) and until 1980 only 13 negative 
decisions have been taken. This changed only gradually with the introduction of the 
common market from the 1980s onwards. However, prior to enlargement it has been 
widely acknowledged that European state aid control enjoys a good level of compliance 
and can be regarded as a success story (Wolf 2005, p. 88, 90; Lavdas and Mendrinou 
1999). Furthermore, the Commission nowadays takes a strong stance against unlawful 
aid. In recent years, the Commission has been more and more willing to reach negative 
decisions and to enforce decisions with recovery payment where aid has already been 
paid. In 1993, British Aerospace was the first case of aid repayment involving reim-
bursement of the interest advantage on the granted aid.3 Yet, the repayment of unlawful 
aid is still a rather difficult task as it depends on national authorities. Former Competi-
tion Commissioner Kroes has noted that only a small percentage of aids banned by the 
Commission are ever recovered and has stressed the duty of the member states to act to 
improve compliance (Wishlade 2006, p.237). Even though Art. 228 TFEU gives the 
Commission the power to seek penalties against a party ignoring a court order this pro-
vision has not been used in the realm of state aid control. At least the Commission now 
                                                 
3   Case C-294/90: British Aerospace Public Ltd Company and Rover Group Holdings plc v Commis 
sion of the European Communities, Judgement of 4.2.1992, ECR 1992, p. I-00493. See also: Press 
Release  (IP/93/405,  26.05.1993)  and  http://commercial.practicallaw.com/7-100-4046  (accessed 
18.6.2010).  
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initiates  infringement proceedings  against  a  member  state  that  does  not  take  all  the 
measures available to implement the recovery of unlawful aid. In this respect the num-
ber of pending recovery decisions has been reduced (from 94 in 2004 to 43 in 2009). 
Yet, half of the pending decisions were adopted more than four years ago (European 
Commission 2009). While the Commission is not always in a position to act promptly to 
safeguard the interests of third parties in state aid matters, national courts may be better 
placed to ensure that breaches of the rules (in particular Article 108 (3) TFEU are dealt 
with and remedied (Jestaedt et al. 2006).  
In 2005, the Commission published a so called State Aid Action Plan (SAAP) with the 
objective of ‘less and better targeted state aid’. It shall encourage member states to re-
duce their overall state aid levels, whilst redirecting state aid resources at objectives 
having a clear community interest. The attitudes towards state aid were influenced by 
the Lisbon Agenda, with the Council of Ministers taking a growing interest in the scale 
and efficiency of government intervention, which is reflected in the objective of ‘Less 
aid, but better’ (Wishlade 2006, p.233).  
Figure 1:  
Total State Aid, Less Agriculture, Fisheries and Transport, for the EU-27, 1992 – 2008,  







1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total aid Total aid excl. crisis measures
 
Source: State Aid Scoreboard, Autumn 2009 (one case in 1997, Credit Lyonnais, responsible for kink) 
The amount of state aid in Europe has steadily declined over recent decades. And, main-
ly because it used to reflect nationally-oriented industrial policies that, with the deepen-
ing of European integration in the common market, became increasingly untenable (lev-
el playing field). It is only in the most recent past and effected by the outbreak of the  
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current financial crisis and the economic policy-reactions of most European govern-
ments, that state aid (in the broadest sense) jumped markedly in 2008 (see Figure 1).  
 
2.b  State Aid in the Central Planning System 
In a centrally planned economy, state aid has been an essential instrument: budgetary 
subsidies were necessary to compensate firms for the losses incurred by producing un-
der a distorted price system. At the beginning of the transition period, these subsidies 
could be reduced with the price liberalization. However, the decline of budgetary subsi-
dies was followed by the emergence of a series of indirect and less transparent forms of 
state support to inefficient firms and sectors; state aid has become an important instru-
ment during the process of economic transformation in most CEECs (Atanasiu 2001, p. 
263ff). Even though facilitating the development of a market economy involves massive 
injections of state support (Hashi 2004), the bulk of aid measures to enterprises was not 
connected to any long term development policy but to rescuing enterprises in difficulty 
in order to ‘speed up the adjustment process and rescue as many enterprises as possi-
ble’. This was motivated to a large extent by political and electoral considerations (Ha-
shi 2004). Rescue and restructuring policies of the early transition period may be de-
scribed as unplanned, reactive and non transparent and had a strong ‘crisis management’ 
feature: “[o]pen and hidden subsidies flowed to some enterprises and sectors even when 
it was established that many of them had no future in a competitive market economy 
and had to exit anyway.” (Hashi 2004, p.3). Thus, there has been a tremendous misfit 
between post-communist state aid policies and the state aid policy of the European Un-
ion (Blauberger 2007) and a tremendous need for adjustment of state aid rules according 
to the acquis communautaire in the pre-accession period.  
The policy change was initiated with the beginning of the accession negotiations to the 
EU. The CEEC’s commitment to adapt national state aid policies according to European 
rules dates back to the entry into force of the Europe Agreements. In order to finalise 
accession negotiations in competition (chapter 6), candidate countries had to fulfil three 
criteria:  
•  administrative capacity (i.e. national monitoring authorities) 
•  sufficient legislative alignment (i.e. application of the state aid acquis) 
•  credible enforcement record 
The Europe Agreements contain state aid provisions that closely followed the model of 
the EC Treaty (general ban), which instruct the CEECs to eliminate state aid if it distorts 
trade with the EU and to make their state aid expenditures transparent (Atanasiu, 2001, 
p.259). Between 1997-2001, all CEECs adopted national state aid laws [see reports in 
the ESTAL] and established national authorities, the Commission was not authorized to  
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decide on state aid issues until accession of the CEECs. Those national state aid rules 
and enforcement authorities served also as test for the time after EU accession:  
‘Harmonisation in this context takes on a specific character, one that is more about 
learning to play the game than about borrowing rules’ (Cremona, 2003, p.287) 
 
2.c  Accession  egotiations and ‘Existing Aid’ 
According to the general EC rules on state aid, all aid which is granted by acceding 
countries before accession to the European Union qualifies as ‘existing aid’ (Regulation 
659/1999). Legal consequences of such a qualification as existing aid are i.e. that the 
Commission can modify an existing aid only with effect for the future and cannot order 
recovery of aid which has been disbursed in the past under existing aid measures. How-
ever, the Commission was concerned that the CEE acceding countries would not learn 
fast enough ‘to play the game’ as they would not dispose of sufficiently independent 
state aid control authorities. Thus, different to any prior accession, also all aid granted 
prior to accession qualified as new aid, unless it was specifically qualified as existing 
aid in Annex IV to the Accession Treaty (Rapp 2005). The latter refers to the following 
categories (Dias 2004): 
•  Aid measures put into effect before 10 December 1994 are per se deemed to be 
existing aid.  
•  Measures submitted by CEECs until November 2002 were examined by Com-
mission in the light of the state aid acquis. If those measures were considered to 
be in line with EC state aid rules, they were qualified as existing aid and listed in 
an Appendix to the Accession Treaty (320 measures were submitted by CEECs, 
222 measures were approved). 
•  Measures submitted before 1 May 2004 and approved by the Commission under 
the ‘interim-procedure’ are also considered as existing aid (559 measures were 
submitted). 
The interim mechanism is legally unprecedented. It added a second layer on the filtering 
process of pre-accession aid in as much as the Commission examined the national au-
thorities’ assessments. The acceding countries were under no obligation to notify their 
aid measures under the interim-procedure. However, in order to benefit from the classi-
fication as ‘existing aid’ and in order to obtain legal certainty, it has been in the CEECs 
own interest to notify all pre-accession state aid. The Commission strongly encouraged 
the candidate countries to follow the interim procedure and as a result, the Commission 
received a notification by the CEECs for 559 measures.  
Finally, a number of transitional rules resulted from rather lengthy and complicated ne-
gotiations in the competition policy chapter of the acquis communautaire. These meas- 
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ures follow a different regime and do not fall under the treatment of Annex IV.4  The 
transitional framework included: temporary rules on incompatible fiscal aid for Poland, 
Hungary and Slovakia as well as sector specific exceptions regarding the restructuring 
of the steel industry in Poland and the Czech Republic. Poland additionally achieved a 
number of exemptions regarding state aid for environmental protection. Only the Baltic 
States and Slovenia did not conclude transitional agreements. Hence, these transitional 
rules mark one point, were aid in the CEECs is more targeted at individual firms or in-
dustries. However, the transitional rules phase out (even though at different dates) and 
all member states have to adjust their industrial policies according to the same rules 
(Känkänen 2003).5  
Although the Commission could exert its control function via the interim-procedure al-
ready before accession, the year 2004 marks a crucial turning point for the CEECs as 
the national state aid laws became obsolete and the exclusive competence to control 
state aid measures has been transferred to the European Commission. Since then, state 
aid policies in most of the CEECs have changed significantly. Since then, state aid mon-
itoring authorities have only an advisory function. However, this function may differ in 
the CEECs. The Polish advisory system does not expressly prohibit the granting of aid 
before the competition authority issues its opinion. Based on the available information, 
this appears to be different in Estonia, where the authority may not grant aid before re-
ceiving an opinion from the Ministry of Finance, which is the competent state aid au-
thority in Estonia.6    
 
2.d  Developing Competition Culture  
Whilst by 2001, all acceding countries had adopted national competition laws; this did 
not necessarily result in a competition culture already comparable to the old EU mem-
ber states. In fact, the amount of state aid granted in the CEECs surpassed the intensity 
that was common amongst the EU-15 member states: in 2000, total state aid amounted 
to some 1.1 per cent of GDP (measured in purchasing power standard) amongst the 
CEECs against only 0.4 per cent amongst the EU-15 (Figure 2). The difference became 
even larger in 2003 with 1.9 per cent versus 0.4 per cent respectively. In the most recent 
past, the aid level among the CEECs has nearly reached West European levels and yet it 
is still somewhat higher (0.7 per cent in 2008) than in the EU-15 countries (0.4 per cent 
in 2008).  
                                                 
4   Additionally, aid measures in the agricultural and transport sector do not fall under the procedure of 
Annex IV. 
5   Those temporary arrangements may have been particularly important for the new EU members: as 
formally centrally planned economies, the criterion of competition obviously was absent for decades. 
The CEECs as catching up economies only started to generate a small and medium sized enterprise 
sector and competed with fellow transition countries to attract foreign direct investment. 
6   § 34 (5) of the Estonian Competition Act. See also Kuik 2008.  
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Figure 2:    
Total State Aid, Less Agriculture, Fisheries and Transport, 2000 – 2008, 
as Percentages of GDP (excluding crisis measures) 
 
 Source: State Aid Scoreboard, Autumn 2009 
However, parallel to the decline in state aid the amount of aid deriving from EU funds 
(including agriculture and structural funds) to the CEECs increased rapidly (Figure 3). 
The EU structural funds are the financial instruments of the European Union’s regional 
policy. In order to narrow the development disparities among member states, i.e. to re-
solve structural economic and social problems, financial assistance is granted. There-
fore, community aid can be used to co-finance projects concerning R&D, employment, 
training, regional development etc. Thus, it can be concluded that to some extent, for-
mer state aid measures have been substituted by community means.  
Anyway and returning to state aid, over time, the average differences were not especial-
ly striking, and large country-variations exist with Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slova-
kia, Poland, and Slovenia at the higher end of the spectrum and Estonia, Bulgaria, and 
Lithuania at the lower (Figure 4). The CEECs are hence not at all homogeneous with re-
spect to their spending for state aid.  
These differences may already raise the preliminary expectation that state aid policy in 
Central East Europe is, in general, more lenient than in the West: institution-building, 
importance attached to FDI for swift and budgetary relevant privatisation with the ex-
pectation of international technology transfer, the apparent difficult negotiations with 
the EU over the acquis communautaire, and a playing field with respect to competition 
policy slightly tilted towards the East (Hölscher and Stephan 2004 and 2009), all serve 
to nourish this assumption. Further, the intensity of use of state aid in industrial policy 
will in general tend to be more pro-active in economies with larger productivity gaps, 
lower sectoral diversity or adjustment to international division of labour, and structural 
flexibility in general. Whilst this comparative issue is rather underrepresented in the li- 
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terature (Blauberger 2009), and no clear answer can be derived so far, the compliance li-
terature in other policy-fields does maybe surprisingly suggest that there is no signifi-
cant lag in institutional enforcement amongst the CEECs (see e.g. Falkner and Treib 
2008): they find a good pattern of transposition of EU law into national law in the four 
investigated CEECs but rather flawed enforcement (which incidentally could also be 
observed in two old member states, namely Italy and Ireland). 
Figure 3:  
State Aid and Community Aid in CEEC, 2000 – 2008,  







Community Aid for CEEC State Aid in CEEC
 
 Source: State Aid Scoreboard, Autumn 2009; EU Financial Report 2008 
On the other side, evaluations of innovation policies in Central East Europe suggest that 
their emergence after EU accession largely followed the same assumption as in Western 
Europe, i.e. that the countries do generate very good basic research, alas lack results in 
terms of commercialisation of research results or inventions (see e.g. Kattel et al. 2009, 
p. 25). Furthermore, the application of instruments produced a much stronger horizontal 
bias than was common in Western Europe at the same time. This is attributed both to 
the way that policy makers in the East apparently understood EU state aid regulations 
(Reid and Peter 2008), and to a general neo-liberal perspective and macro-policy bias of 
policy makers during the early 2000s (see e.g. Kattel et al. 2009, p. 25). Both interpreta-
tions tend to suggest a tendency towards a level playing field. This issue hence remains 
open, and it is the task of the analytical chapter 3 to test this hypothesis by providing a 
quantitative overview, by way of qualitative analysis, and by reviewing example repre-
sentative cases.  
  
IWH   __________________________________________________________________ 
 
IWH Discussion Papers 24/2010 
16
Figure 4:  
Total State Aid for CEECs, Less Agriculture, Fisheries and Transport, 2004 – 2008,  
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Source: State Aid Scoreboard, Autumn 2009 
3   Comparative Analysis of State Aid: Stylised Facts 
Looking more closely into state aid as discussed above, we start with analysing differ-
ences in the application of broad instruments and objectives of state aid and then refer to 
particularly insightful cases to shed some more specific light on the particularities of 
state aid in CEECs. 
 
3.a  The Choice of State Aid Instruments in East and West 
One clear difference between East and West in the choice of instruments lies in a strong 
bias on tax exemptions and social security contributions in the East. This may be rooted 
in a laxer execution of such commitments (they were often not treated as a form of state 
aid) and because the possibility of state aid via direct grants was still widely unknown 
(Biegunski 2008). Further, the rather low share of direct grants might have been due to 
tighter  budgetary  positions  amongst  the  transition  economies  (Schütterle  2004).  By 
2007, the most favoured aid instruments in 20 member states including CEECs had 
been direct grants followed by tax exemptions. We no longer find a difference between 
East and West regarding the choice of instruments. Yet, Slovenia and Estonia provided 
more than 90% of their aid in the form of grants, while Bulgaria granted more than 80% 
of their aid through tax exemptions (European Commission 2008).  
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3.b  State Aid Objectives in East and West 
In terms of objectives of state aid, the European Commission distinguishes two broad 
categories: horizontal and sectoral state aid, the former being largely synonymous with 
‘well-targeted’ state aid (European Commission 2005). Sectoral aid is considered to be 
an important instrument in the course of restructuring and privatizing state-owned en-
terprises (Ellison 2005, p.26). The Commission’s State Aid Scoreboard classifies re-
gional aid as ‘horizontal’, suggesting such aid is in line with the shift to more broadly-
based objectives. However, much of regional state aid ends up in the hands of individual 
firms and investors (ibid., p.25). State aid for horizontal objectives, i.e. not granted to a 
certain industry sector, is considered as being better suited to address market failures 
and thus less distortive than sectoral aid. In the mid Nineties, only around 50% of aid 
was granted for horizontal objectives in the old member states. As it was one of the key 
Lisbon purposes to redirect state aid towards horizontal objectives, the share increased 
rapidly in the EU-15 countries. In the CEECs, data only exists from the year 2000 on-
wards: here, the share of horizontal aid decreased prior to accession. After accession, 
the share increased rapidly and reached the same level as in the old member states by 
2008 (Figure 5). Moreover, the share of horizontal aid is even larger in CEECs when 
crisis measures are included. Due to the financial crisis and the following aid measures 
especially to the financial industry, the share of horizontal aid in the EU-15 countries 
fell to 16 percent. 
However, the distinction of aid between horizontal and secoral objectives is not always 
exact. This holds especially for the CEECs as prior to accession their national authori-
ties were the sole source of information (e.g. aid to the national railway companies have 
been reported as sectoral or, in order to act in line with EU policies and make it more 
acceptable, as horizontal for employment aid). Furthermore, there are concerns that not 
all aid was reported, especially tax and social contribution arrears (Hashi 2004, p. 12).  
Disparities between East and West before accession can be explained in part by the re-
structuring of industries in order to reach viability and to complete privatization. Fur-
thermore, CEECs took advantage of the transitional rules and the rules on existing aid, 
agreed upon in the accession negotiations. The previous more lenient treatment of state 
aid became more difficult after accession as the CEECs had to comply with the Euro-
pean state aid rules. Thus, in several member states, the last chance for sectoral aid was 
exploited. After accession, the speed of adjustment of national state aid policies howev-
er differed between CEECs. Horizontal policies in general did not generate much inter-
est in Poland as compared to other countries prior to accession. State aid in Poland had a 
bias on large enterprises with a share of around 60% (Blauberger 2009, p.163). The 
Polish government seemed to give national policy goals precedence over European state 
aid policy (most prominent examples include the shipyards, see case study in the fol-
lowing section and Blauberger 2007, p. 25). Other CEECs, as Estonia and Slovenia, 
showed already in the year 2000 a share of horizontal aid above 75%. The government 
in Estonia always spent public support solely for horizontal measures (Table 5, Annex).  
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Figure 5:    













2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2008*
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2008* includes crisis measures. 
Source: State Aid Scoreboard, Autumn 2009 and Autumn 2004. 
However, the last Scoreboard of Autumn 2009 no longer shows clear disparities be-
tween old and CEECs regarding the shares for sectoral aid (see Table 3 and 4, Annex). 
Nearly all member states have reduced their level of sectoral aid to a minimum, with the 
exception of Malta, Portugal and Romania.7 However, large disparities between mem-
ber states remain in the share of aid awarded to various horizontal objectives. The pre-
dominant objective for horizontal aid in the 10 CEECs is aid for regional development 
(34% in 2006, 44% in 2008), followed by employment aid (17% in 2006, 19% in 2008). 
Aid for R&D (6%), environmental objectives (6%) and SME (4%) play only a minor 
role. In comparison, the most favoured objective in the EU-15 countries has been aid for 
environment and energy saving, to which 27% of aid were granted. However, differenc-
es in the allocation of aid measures among the member states do not clearly exist be-
tween CEECs and the EU-15 but rather between North-West and South-East Countries. 
Whereas the Nordic countries (including the Baltic State) spend nearly 100% of all aid 
to horizontal measures like R&D and environmental protection, the Southern countries 
allocate a large proportion of aid to sectoral or regional objectives (Figure 6).  
 
 
                                                 
7   The low share of horizontal aid in Malta can be explained by a tax relief measure under the Business 
Promotion Act 37, while in Portugal it is due to a large regional aid tax scheme (being phased out) in 
Madeira which in practice benefits a limited number of sectors. In Romania, a significant proportion 
of aid continues to be granted to the manufacturing sector as well as to the mining industry.  
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Figure 6:  
Differences  in  the  allocation  of  aid  measures  between  North-West  and  South-East 
member States 
 
Light grey member states: only horizontal measures, these mainly attributed to R&D and environmental objectives. 
Dark grey member states: a large proportion of sectoral aid and horizontal aid mainly used for regional development 
or employment measures. 
Source: State Aid Scoreboard: Autumn 2009; own presentation. 
After accession, aid granted in CEECs in support of regional development and cohesion 
reached the highest shares in all years, the entire territory of each CEEC is eligible for 
regional aid under Article 107(3)a TFEU (ex 87(3)a TEC). This is particularly pro-
nounced in the cases of Lithuania and the Czech and Slovak Republics and particularly 
low for Montenegro (not yet a member state) and Cyprus and Estonia. 
SME programmes drew the attention of all post communist governments, as SMEs are 
key players in a market economy as they respond quickly to market signals and promote 
competitiveness (OECD 1992). However, SME support programmes have attracted only 
a small amount of resources. Contrary, the share of aid regarding rescue and restructur-
ing (R&R) of companies started high (Hashi (2004) reports that in Poland 20% respec-
tively 23% of all aid in 2001 and 2002 were used for this objective) and fell to a level 
similar to EU-15 member states (Figure 7). However, often R&R aid is supposed to be 
reported under employment schemes, e.g. in Poland in 2000: R&R aid amounted to only 
7%  whereas  employment  aid  levelled  at  24%  (Hashi  2004,  p.  16).  Thus,  the  total 
amount of aid related to rescue and restructuring will be even higher. From a country  
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perspective, in the period 2004 to 2009 Poland showed the most cases with the objective 
to rescue or restructure an individual company or implement a scheme to do so. 
Figure 7:  
Rescue and Restructuring aid (R&R), in million €, 2003-2008 (without Financial Sector) 
  
Source: State Aid Scoreboard: Statistical Tables, Autumn 2009 
 
3.c  Formal Investigation Procedures 
Another indicator for the establishment of a state aid level playing field is the number of 
decisions to open a formal investigation, because such decisions must already summa-
rise the relevant issues of fact and law. It further must include a preliminary assessment 
as to the aid character of the measure and set out the commission’s doubts as to the 
compatibility with the common market.  
Table 1: 
Formal Investigation Procedures in CEECs, Years 2004 - 2009 
  2004    2005    2006    2007    2008    2009    Total 
State Aid Pro-
ceedings  32    146    176    119    107    111    691 
No objections  27    134    161    110    101    103    636 
Formal Inves-
tigation  5    12    15    9    6    8    55 
Share of formal 
investigation  15,6%    8,2%    8,5%    7,6%    5,6%    7,2%    8,0% 
Source: State Aid Register (Online Database).  
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The share of state aid cases, in which a preliminary assessment was followed by a for-
mal investigation procedure, significantly fell after 2004 and in 2009 reached a mere 
eight per cent in comparison to over 15 per cent in 2004 (Table 1). Yet, huge differences 
among the CEECs exist: whereas the share in Poland, Rumania, and Hungary is above 
average (11, 28 and 10%), other member states were not yet confronted with a formal 
investigation procedure at all (Estonia, Lithuania). 
 
3.d  Final Decisions: 
The existence of pre-accession state aid enforcement in the CEECs has not stopped the 
Commission  from  initiating  formal  investigation  procedures  into  certain  measures 
adopted before accession (Kuik 2004). Those pre-accession measures are not directly 
regulated by Article 107 and 108 TFEU, but by separate Protocols listed in the particu-
lar Accession Treaties. 
Table 2: 
Share of Positive and Negative Decisions, Share of Un-notified Aid, Years 2004 – 2010 
  Positive*    Negative    Un-notified aid 
EU-27  97.65%    2.35%    9.9% 
EU-15  97.49%    2.51%    10.4% 
CEECs  98.09%    1.91%    8.1% 
* This figure includes not only “positive decisions”, but also all other decisions with a positive outcome (e.g. Art. 
4(3) decision not to raise objections)  
Source: State Aid Register, own calculations. 
As Table 2 shows, the share of un-notified aid is lower in the case of the CEECs as 
compared to the old EU-15. As it can be assumed that the EU commission and not least 
competitors will keep a close eye on state aid granted, this does indicate that the gov-
ernments in CEECs play by the rules. This is mirrored in the share of negative deci-
sions, which is also lower in CEECs than in the EU-15 countries (1.91% compared to 
2.51%). 
We should not expect the EU commission to take a more permissibly stance towards 
state aid in the CEECs: since accession, the Commission released 15 negative decisions 
regarding state aid measures in CEECs. Thereof, nine cases required recovery of unlaw-
ful aid. The 15 decisions concerned aid measures in Poland (6), Hungary (5), Romania 
(1), Slovakia (3).  Most of these cases concern the restructuring of companies (6) or a 
sectoral development (4), both objectives which are assumed to cause most distortionary 
effects on competition (See Table 6, Annex). A detailed discussion of selected state aid 
cases will be given in the following section.  
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4  Selected State Aid Cases 
For this exemplary analysis we chose to analyse negative decisions as these are the cas-
es most critical in order to reach a level playing field among all member states. In order 
to sketch some of the differences in EU state aid control between East and West, we 
compare a small selection of state aid cases in CEECs and in EU-15 countries. We take 
it that these examples are quite insightful with respect to our general conclusion that EU 
state aid control in the East is in fact strict: the gloves are off. The first case study re-
lates to decisions in the steel industry being a very common subject to state aid proceed-
ings. Furthermore, the case of ‘Huta Czestochowa’ has been the first negative decision 
requiring recovery in the CEECs. Another prominent sector in terms of state aid investi-
gations is the shipyard industry. Two negative decisions in the CEECs regard state aid 
measures in favour of Polish shipyards, including the highest recovery amounts among 
the CEECs and thus an assumed large economic and social impact. In contrast, the last 
case study was chosen, because it regards a measure in an industry not traditionally af-
fected by state aid proceedings as the affected company ‘Frucona Kosice’ produces con-
sumer goods. Regarding the sample from EU-15 countries we selected cases from Ger-
many and Greece that are to some extent comparable to the cases in CEECs and com-
pare the decisions taken by the EU – again in support of our general conclusion. 
 
4.a  Steel Industry 
The first negative decision that also required repayment of aid in a CEEC concerned aid 
in favour of the second largest Polish steel producer ‘Huta Czestochowa’ (HC). Restruc-
turing aid in the steel sector is generally prohibited. However, the Polish government 
negotiated transition rules regarding state aid for the steel industry. HC could not take 
an advantage of the transitional rules as it was not listed in Protocol No. 8 of the Acces-
sion Treaty. This document, however, listed companies active in the Polish steel indus-
try to receive restructuring aid. Initially, it was the aim of the Polish government to li-
quidate  the  company  (Saryusz-Wolska  2010).  However,  the  government  decided  in 
2003 to restructure the company in view of a subsequent privatisation.  
In 2004, the Commission opened a formal investigation concerning state aid granted by 
Poland to HC starting from 1997 onwards under the “interim-mechanism”. Albeit the 
final decision of 5th July 2005 found that measures taken for the restructuring process 
between 2002 and 2005 did not constitute state aid (the restructuring plans included a 
partial write-off of public and commercial debt claims), certain measures in the period 
prior to the restructuring (1997-2002) were found to be incompatible with the internal 
market: Poland had, in anticipation of the national restructuring plan, provided HC with 
restructuring aids amounting to approximately four million Euro. The Commission or-
dered recovery of these four million Euro.    
__________________________________________________________________   IWH 
 
IWH Discussion Papers 24/2010 
23 
The case has been novel as it concerned a pre-accession aid measure. And even though 
an exhaustive list of companies in the Polish steel sector were allowed to receive state 
aid and listed in Protocol No. 8 to the Accession Treaty, HC was not on the list. In fact, 
the company was taken off the list of beneficiaries in the last minute due to its financial 
difficulties. The parties argued before the General Court that the Commission did not 
have the power to investigate, as the state aid was granted between 1997 and 2002.  The 
Commission on the other side argued that Protocol No. 8 is a lex specialis and extends 
monitoring to any aid granted for the restructuring of the Polish steel industry between 
1997 and 2006. The Court agreed with the Commission and thus Protocol No. 8 builds 
the legal basis for the Commission to order recovery. 
Further on, the parties challenged the way the commission had set the recovery interest. 
However, the commission was under no obligation to indicate the recovery rates in the 
decision itself. As the recovery interest had been set in close cooperation with Polish au-
thorities, the order of the parties has been dismissed. Thus, Poland had to recover the 
four million Euro from  HC.  It is  further worth  mentioning that the  amount thereby 
deemed unlawful has already been repaid. Out of the eight negative decisions in the 
CEECs  that  required  recovery  only  the  aid  in  favour  of  ‘Huta  Warszawa’,  another 
Polish steel producer, has already been repaid. 
Under the national restructuring programme for the Polish steel industry and the special 
steel rules for Poland, Polish steel producer ‘Huta Warszawa’ (HW) received about 50 
million Euro of state aid mainly in the form of a state guarantee for a loan to pursue its 
investment plan. However, HW had used around 30 million Euro of the loan in 2004 to 
pay off some old debts. The Commission found that this measure was neither indicated 
in the restructuring plan nor necessary for the restructuring, but, on the contrary, endan-
gered the company's return to viability. The Commission therefore concluded that, that 
part of the aid had been misused and was incompatible with the Single Market. In 2005 
Arcelor had taken over the company (AHW) and repaid the guaranteed loan and up-
dated the business plan of the  company in order to ensure long term  viability. The 
Commission considered that the advantage stemming from the guarantee during one 
year was an interest subsidy for the loan amounting to around €2 million. In order to 
settle the case AHW agreed to repay this amount.  
In Western Europe, especially companies in Spain and the German New Länder were 
subject to state aid proceedings regarding state aid measures for rescuing and restructur-
ing companies in difficulties. One example is the ‘Eisenguss Torgelow GmbH’ (EGT) 
in Germany which received aid measures between 1998 and 2000 that were not prior 
notified to the Commission as it is required. After privatization in 1993 the company 
filed for bankruptcy in 1997. The company was sold to a group of investors but restruc-
turing failed and the company filed again for bankruptcy in 2001. On 1 May 2001 EGT 
was declared bankrupt. While for the second time bankruptcy proceedings were under 
way, the firm was maintained as a going concern and the assets were sold to a new in-
vestor, CHL. In these two restructuring periods EGT received state aid measures total- 
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ing 9 million Euro, whereof 1.5 million are in question.8 The Commission concluded in 
its decision that the initial restructuring plan was not efficient in order to restore viabili-
ty. This argument is supported by the second insolvency in 2001. Thus, aid in the height 
of 1.5 million Euro had to be recovered. The second restructuring and another sale of 
the company in 2004 brought the change. The number of employees increased from 64 
in 2003 to 700 in 2008. Turnover rose from 5 million Euro in 2003 to 82 million Euro in 
2007 and 140 in 2008.  
Besides the East German example, also companies in the Western part of Germany have 
been found of having received unlawful aid. Two examples are the ‘Salzgitter AG‘ 
(SAG) and the ‘Hamburger Stahlwerke’ (HSW). The Cases were decided 1995 and 
2000. SAG received tax allowances according due to their special location close to the 
GDR border. However, the Commission found that SAG was not able to profit from the 
tax allowances as SAG is a steel company and, as such, subject to the stricter rules of 
the ECSC Treaty and the Steel Aid Code. The aid granted was incompatible with that 
legislation. HSW has been in financial difficulties and received a loan which the Com-
mission found to be incompatible with the rules of the ECSC Treaty and the Steel Aid 
Code. In both cases, Germany has been ordered to recover the aid. However, in both 
cases the recovery has been delayed, also due to long court proceedings. Yet, both cases 
still belong to the list of pending recovery cases were the unlawful aid measures have 
not been recovered yet (State Aid Scoreboard 2009, Statistical Tables).  
 
4.b  Shipyards 
The largest attention of all state aid cases was probably received by the Polish shi-
pyards, not least due to its political implications (birthplace of Solidarnosc). On 1st June 
2005, the Commission published its decision to open a formal investigation examining 
state aid measures in favour of three Polish shipyards in Gdynia, Gdansk, and Szczecin.  
Since 2002, the shipyards have benefited from several aid measures such as capital in-
jections, guarantees, loans, and tax write-offs totalling several billions of Euros. Con-
trary to other sectors (and unlike Malta), Poland, with its relatively large shipbuilding 
industry, did not negotiate any transitional arrangements for the application of State aid 
rules to this sector. The investigation lasted more than three years; the case was mean-
while  also  negotiated  between  Commissioner  Kroes  and  the  Polish  prime  minister 
(Blauberger 2009). In November 2008, the Commission published its first two decisions 
coming to the conclusion that the aid granted to Gdynia and Szczecin constitute unlaw-
ful aid and subsequently have to be repaid.   
                                                 
8   The company site has received further 14 million Euro aid from the local government which does 
not fall under the European state aid rules as it derives from funds for investment in low developed 
regions, partly co-financed by European Fund for Regional Development and the European Social 
Fund.  http://freierjournalist.wordpress.com/2007/12/06/alles-giest/   
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The two yards have been in difficulties since the 1990s. In April 2004, Poland notified 
restructuring aid for the two yards whereupon the Commission opened formal investiga-
tions in June 2005 (see IP/05/644). As EU state aid rules concerning the shipbuilding 
industry require aid to be based on far-reaching restructuring plans, the Commission re-
quired Poland to submit such restructuring plans, which occurred with substantial delays 
only in September 2005 and September 2006. The Commission came to the conclusion 
that none of the plans would have ensured long-term viability of the yards and the re-
structuring would have been financed entirely by state aid (also private capital is neces-
sary in order to be in line with state aid rules). In December 2006, Poland decided to 
privatise the shipyards, a process, delayed several times, that finally led to potential in-
vestors submitting restructuring plans for the two yards on 12 September 2008. Howev-
er, despite further large amounts of state aid and substantial job losses foreseen in these 
plans, the Commission found that the yards would still not have been commercially via-
ble. Hence, the subsidies received by the Gdynia and Szczecin shipyards did not comply 
with the guidelines on rescue and restructuring aid but rather constituted illegal operat-
ing aid. The Commission decision required repayment of the illegal aid totalling 3.3 bil-
lion Euros. Poland committed that the recovery will be implemented by way of a sale of 
assets. The existing companies owning the yards, with the remaining assets and liabili-
ties, will be liquidated. However, no investor was found and only a few assets of the 
shipyards could be sold. Thus, the repayment of unlawful aid could not have been com-
plied with and the two shipyards had to declare bankruptcy at the end of 2009. 
In contrast, in July of 2009 the European Commission has authorised the various sup-
port measures in favour of the Gdansk shipyard worth 251 million Euro. The company 
had been successfully privatised in 2007 to a Ukrainian industrial group (ISD). Initially, 
the new owner attempted to merge the shipyards in Gdansk and Gdynia, but the Com-
mission rejected this plan, mainly because it was not sufficient to ensure a return of the 
yards to long-term viability. Subsequently, ISD presented a restructuring plan solely for 
the shipyard in Gdansk that has been financed to a large extent from private resources. 
The Commission concluded that the plan will ensure the viability of the yard and that 
the distortions of competition, caused by years of subsidised operations, will be ade-
quately reduced by production capacity closures. The Commission decision of 2009 has 
authorised state aid granted to Gdansk Shipyard since 2004 when Poland entered the EU 
in  order  to  finance  the  yard's  restructuring.  The  decision  also  authorised production 
guarantees. As the continuous subsidies for the yard's production since 2002 caused a 
significant distortion of competition on the shipbuilding market, the yard's shipbuilding 
capacity has to be reduced substantially. According to the restructuring plan, the yard 
will close two of its three slipways. 
The Commission investigation in the Polish shipyard cases may have been protracted 
due to strategic considerations. The Commission might have thought that it is disadvan-
tageous to launch a potentially negative decision prior or parallel to the ongoing negoti-
ations regarding the Treaty of Lisbon. The Commission released its negative decision 
one month after Poland had signed the treaty in October 2009.  
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Most negative decisions of the EC regard state aid measures in order to rescue or re-
structure companies. In most cases they fail the formal investigation due to a missing or 
unrealistic restructuring plan and a missing private investor financing the majority of the 
restructuring. Many decisions regarding state aid in East Germany during the 1990s 
concluded that without a private investor permanent losses are made or more state aid is 
necessary. In contrast, in cases were a private investor was found and a realistic restruc-
turing plan was presented, the Commission came to a positive decision. 
This is also reflected in the Polish shipyards cases. The Commission came to a positive 
decision in the case of the shipyard in Gdansk: the yard presented a restructuring plan 
and the restructuring has been financed to a large extent from private resources. Thus, 
the Commission concluded that viability of the yard will be given. Furthermore, distor-
tions of competition, caused by years of subsidised operations, will be adequately re-
duced as production capacity will be reduced substantially. The situation is different in 
the  other  two  cases:  according  to  the  EC  none  of  the  submitted  restructuring plans 
would have ensured long-term viability to the yards and restructuring would have been 
financed entirely by state aid and not by a private investor. The Commission therefore 
concluded that the subsidies received by the Gdynia and Szczecin shipyards did not 
comply with the guidelines on rescue and restructuring aid but rather constituted illegal 
operating aid. 
The shipyard sector in Europe is consistently subject to formal investigation procedures 
regarding the legality of state aid measures.9 Another European case concerns a shi-
pyard in Greece: Hellenic shipyard (HSY). The Commission authorised aid measures in 
benefit of HSY in 1997 and 2002. However, in 2008 the Commission found, that condi-
tions attached to the aid were not respected. HSY had not fully implemented the in-
vestment plan necessary to modernise the yard and exceeded the specified capacity limi-
tation. Thus, the Commission came to the conclusion that aid measures totalling 230 
million Euro constituted unlawful aid and have to be recovered.  
 
4.c  Consumer Goods 
A third case in the CEECs regards state aid in favour of Frucona Kosice (FK), a me-
dium-sized company in Eastern Slovakia, that used to be one of the major producers of 
distiller spirits and spirit-based beverages in Slovakia and currently operates as a dis-
tributor. In 2004, Frucona’s accumulated tax debts amounted to nearly 17 million Euros. 
The company asked for an arrangement under the applicable insolvency legislation. In 
July 2004, the tax office agreed to write off 65% of its debt (11 million Euro). The 
                                                 
9   Currently, the European Commission discusses whether the framework for aid to the shipbuilding 
sector should be prolonged, revised or expealed. The current framework expires at the end of 2011. 
The Commission therefore also released a consultation in order to receive the opinions by the stake-
holders. See Press Release IP/10/1280 from 4
th October 2010.  
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Commission found that the tax office had not behaved as would be expected of a normal 
commercial creditor in a market economy. However, a state intervention must be made 
on the same conditions that a private creditor would have accepted, without taking ac-
count of socio-political considerations (such as regional or social policy). The Commis-
sion concluded that the tax office would have obtained a higher repayment of its claims 
through a bankruptcy procedure, in which the company would have been sold and the 
tax execution procedure would have allowed direct sale of the company’s assets. The 
debt write-off therefore constituted state aid. 
Such aid would have only been compatible with the Commission’s guidelines on re-
structuring aid, if it were linked to a sustainable restructuring plan. Moreover, such aid 
can only be granted on the condition that the restructuring plan is properly implemented. 
Where this is not the case, the company is considered to have received operating aid, 
which has given it an unfair advantage vis-à-vis its competitors. 
The  Commission  initiated  the  formal  investigation  procedure  in  July  2005.  In  June 
2006, the final decision was published, ordering repayment of the unlawful aid. As Slo-
vakia did not comply with the decision and the aid awarded to FK was not recovered, 
the Commission referred Slovakia to the European Court of Justice in May 2009 (Case-
507/08). Even though the Slovak Republic vowed to recover the unlawfully granted aid 
in legal the proceedings, the aid has still not been repaid yet. The first instance court 
dismissed the action inter alia because FK’s obligation to pay its debt to the tax authori-
ties arose ex lege. The appeal court upheld the judgment of the first instance court inter 
alia, because it was not possible to review the order concerning the arrangement. This 
was the case, because it must be respected by all bodies, including the appeal court and, 
also, because the Commission in the decision failed to respect the provisions of national 
law governing conflicts between bankruptcy and enforcement proceedings. The judg-
ments of both courts prevent the immediate and effective execution of the Commission 
decision. It is not sufficient that the Slovak Republic made use of all means at its dis-
posal. The application of those means must result in the immediate and effective en-
forcement of the decision, which the Slovak Republic must be considered as having 
failed to fulfil its obligations. A member state fails to fulfil its obligation to recover, if 
the steps taken by that member state have no impact on the actual recovery of those 
amounts. 
Pending recovery decisions have a long ‘tradition’ in EU state aid enforcement10. How-
ever, in recent years the number of such cases is decreasing. The CEECs have besides 
FK four other pending recovery decisions (three in Poland and one in Hungary). The 
figures for EU-15 countries show that by December 2009 for 54 cases the recovery of 
the aid was still pending whereof the oldest not enforced recovery decision dates from 
1997.   
                                                 
10   See chapter 2a Enforcement of State Aid Control in the European Union, page 9f.   
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One of the pending cases in the EU-15 countries regards an aid measure in France in fa-
vour of an American paper company. The case has been initiated by a complaint in 
1996. The Commission concluded in its decision that the state aid in form of a preferen-
tial land price and a preferential rate of water treatment levy granted by France amount-
ing to more than 18 million Euro is incompatible with the common market. The deci-
sion has been released in the year 2000. The last figures of the State Aid Scoreboard 
show that this case is still pending. Therefore in the year 2009 the Commission brought 
also this case to the ECJ.  
In summary, these cases are exemplary in the sense that they show, that the Commission 
does not hesitate to  enforce strict state aid  recovery  even  for the period before EU 
membership, neither for large amounts, nor through involvement of the European Court 
of Justice.  
5  Conclusions 
For the new European members states, state aid is a sensitive issue in particular for poli-
ticians and society: large employers, for which previously the state was responsible, car-
ry not only the largest burden in the industrial restructuring process during transition to 
a market economy but also over a much longer period of time than smaller privatized 
firms. The call to assist them by way of extending previous state subsidies is hence po-
litically pressing. 
Still, once having entered the EU as full members, those countries appear to be converg-
ing into the competition cultures: state aid may well be slightly higher than in the old 
member states, but comparative analysis does suggest that enforcement may be gradual-
ly becoming as effective and strict in the East as is the case in the West: Our quantita-
tive analysis has shown that state aid does assume an increasingly horizontal character, 
in particular with regional cohesion objectives. The share of formal investigation proce-
dures has fallen sharply in CEECs and the share of negative decisions is much lower 
than in the West, as is notably the share of un-notified aid. 
The cases reviewed highlight in detail the strict enforcement of state aid policy in the 
CEECs. It became apparent in all cases that the EU commission executes strict state aid 
control in CEECs that even extends to the period before accession to the EU and adop-
tion of the EU acquis communautaire. No special treatment is granted to the CEECs 
with their particular needs for industrial restructuring – the gloves are off. In fact state 
aid enforcement has been rather draconic: The first Polish example where unlawful aid 
was in fact paid retrospectively for a period before EU membership and the shipyard 
example where the inability of repayment led to bankruptcy and unemployment could 
hardly have been more drastic. The Slovak example shows that the commission uses its 
full arsenal of weapons, in this case a law suit against an EU member’s government be-
fore the European Court of Justice.  
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We would hence conclude that state aid in the new member countries of the European 
Union is today not granted more generously than amongst the old members, it appears 
not to be more targeted at individual firms or industries. Our initial suspicion that state 
aid enforcement may be rather more lax in the East could not be verified, instead state 
aid policy has become at least as strict as in the West and a level playing field can today 
be assumed. 
The current financial crisis has had a significant impact on state aid policy, and it will 
be particularly interesting for future research to test any differences emerging between 
CEECs and EU-15 countries in recent years. So far, we find no indication that the level 
playing field tends to tilt.  
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Annex 
Table 3:  
Share of Primary Objectives of Horizontal Aid in 2008 in CEECs, (as Percentage of To-
tal Aid) 
   CEECs  CZ  EE  LV  LT  HU  PL  SI  SK  BG  RO 
Sectoral  13  6  0  0  0  19  7  11  16  9  47 
Horizontal  87  94  100  100  100  81  93  89  84  91  53 
Environment  6  1  15  21  13  5  8  15  13  0  6 
Regional  44  68  6  47  73  41  39  47  64  13  15 
R&D  6  18  23  2  0  4  1  12  1  15  26 
SME  5  6  13  14  1  3  4  1  4  61  0 
Training  3  1  5  2  10  3  4  1  1  2  0 
Employment  19  0  1  1  3  18  7  11  16  9  47 
Others  4  6  0  0  0  19  93  89  84  91  53 
Source: State Aid Scoreboard, Autumn 2009 
 
Table 4:  
Share of Primary Objectives of Horizontal Aid in 2008 in EU-15 countries, (as Percen-
tage of Total Aid) 
  BE  DK  DE  IE  GR  ES  FR  IT  LX   L  AT  PT  FI  SE  UK 
Sectoral  1  6  13  16  2  21  4  15  0  2  1  84  2  0  9 
Horizontal  99  94  87  84  98  79  96  85  100  98  99  16  98  100  91 
Environment  11  16  40  5  2  12  2  2  15  65  42  0  38  86  41 
Regional  10  0  23  17  76  40  41  18  10  1  8  7  6  6  10 
R&D  48  9  17  15  2  19  25  19  36  18  23  1  29  4  19 
SME  19  0  5  18  16  3  19  26  24  6  20  5  7  0  3 
Training  4  0  1  10  0  1  0  7  0  0  2  0  1  0  2 
Employment  4  66  0  4  0  1  2  7  0  3  1  4  6  0  0 
Others  4  3  2  16  2  3  7  5  14  4  2  0  10  4  15 
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Table 5:  
Share of Horizontal Aid 2000-2008 in EU-27 countries, (as Percentage of Total Aid) 
 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
EU 15  70  67  67  80  79  83  83  84  88 
CEEC  41  29  29  21  34  61  71  75  87 
Belgium  100  100  100  100  100  100  98  100  99 
Bulgaria  -  -  52  36  65  73  79  92  91 
Czech Republic  14  19  12  12  85  100  100  100  94 
Denmark  98  98  95  94  89  98  97  94  94 
Germany  64  61  51  74  77  80  85  82  87 
Estonia  100  100  98  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Ireland  36  43  48  65  72  76  80  82  84 
Greece  97  91  84  94  97  98  98  98  98 
Spain  44  38  70  68  64  65  73  70  79 
France  75  68  73  77  64  90  97  95  96 
Italy  89  96  93  95  94  83  72  86  85 
Cyprus  28  26  32  22  46  45  96  95  95 
Latvia  6  48  74  65  100  96  100  100  100 
Lithuania  3  7  5  18  58  84  100  95  100 
Luxembourg  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Hungary  28  43  53  39  54  48  48  50  81 
Malta  7  5  4  8  6  1  3  3  2 
Netherlands  94  95  95  94  91  93  94  96  98 
Austria  84  98  97  98  99  99  54  99  99 
Poland  69  31  39  15  24  69  85  87  93 
Portugal  35  23  17  19  19  12  12  10  16 
Romania  -  -  42  35  23  48  45  43  53 
Slovenia  75  56  84  81  69  87  88  85  89 
Slovakia  78  43  50  72  61  60  95  76  84 
Finland  85  97  97  97  97  98  97  96  98 
Sweden  100  100  100  100  100  99  99  99  100 
United Kingdom  84  91  77  99  99  90  91  92  91 
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